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                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                           No. 96-8046 
                       ___________________ 
 
                          RONALD MADDEN, 
 
                                    Petitioner 
 
                                v. 
 
                           KEVIN MYERS, 
 
                                    Respondent 
 
                     Honorable Malcolm Muir, 
                      United States District Judge 
 
                                    Nominal Respondent. 
                 ________________________________ 
 
         On Appeal From the United States District Court 
             For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
                   (D.C. Civ. No. 96-cv-00239) 
                __________________________________ 
 
            Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                          August 8, 1996 
 
         Before: BECKER, ALITO and MCKEE, Circuit Judges. 
                        (Motions Panel A) 
 
                     (Filed December 3, 1996) 
 
                        RONALD MADDEN,  
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                        Clifton, TN                          38425-0279 
                                     
                                    Petitioner Pro Se 
 
                        KEVIN MYERS 
                        South Central Correctional Facility 
                        P.O. Box 279 
                        Clifton, TN  38425-0279 
 
                                    Respondent Pro Se  
 
                        HONORABLE MALCOLM MUIR 
                        United States District Judge 
                        P.O. Box 608 
                        Williamsport, PA  17703 
 
                                    Nominal Respondent 
 
 
                                             
 
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                             
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Ronald Madden petitions this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) for 
a writ of 
mandamus requiring the district court to promptly act upon his request for 
habeas corpus relief.  
In his habeas petition filed in the District Court for the Middle District 
of Tennessee, but 
transferred to the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
Madden challenged his 
extradition from Pennsylvania to Tennessee.  On February 21, 1996, nine 
days after receiving the 
submission, the magistrate judge filed a report recommending that the 
habeas petition be denied.  
On March 4, 1996, Madden filed objections to the magistrate judge's 
report, and, on July 15, he 
filed this mandamus petition.  The petition was accompanied by an 
application to proceed informa pauperis; hence we must determine whether 
the filing fee payment requirements of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA" or "Act")apply to mandamus 
petitions.  Because 
we believe that the present petition is not the type of action that 
Congress meant to deter when it 
passed the PLRA, we hold that the fee requirements of the PLRA do not 
apply.  On the merits, 
we deny the mandamus petition. 
 
                                I. 
                                A. 
    Before turning to the merits of Madden's petition, we must determine 
whether he 
may proceed in forma pauperis, and, if so, whether he must pay a filing 
fee of $100.00 pursuant 
to the PLRA.  The PLRA dramatically altered the consequences attached to 
in forma pauperisstatus for prisoners.  28 U.S.C. § 1915; see Santana v. 
United States, No. 96-5276, 1996 WL 
596845, *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 18, 1996) (amended Nov. 14, 1996).  An 
incarcerated in forma pauperislitigant now must pay the full filing fee 
when he brings a civil action or files an appeal, although 
he may pay on an installment plan.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).  Because Mr. 
Madden's affidavit of 
poverty shows that he has only $5.11 in his prison account, has no other 
assets, and has received 
an income of only $35.50 in the past two months, he is entitled to proceed 
in forma pauperis.  
However, if the PLRA is applicable to mandamus actions such as Madden's, 
he must somehow 
pay a fee of $100 in order to obtain judicial review of his petition. 
                                B. 
    The PLRA distinguishes between criminal and civil actions, and 
requires federal 
courts to collect filing fees only in the latter cases, where "a prisoner 
brings a civil action or files 
an appeal." Id. § 1915(b)(1).  Yet a writ of mandamus is by its very 
nature outside the ambit of 
this taxonomy.  It is not an "action", and, a fortiori, not a "civil 
action."  A writ of mandamus, 
which is authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, instead 
constitutes a procedural 
mechanism through which a court of appeals reviews a carefully 
circumscribed and discrete 
category of district court orders.  See Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 
853, 854 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(mandamus is "a procedural step in the ... litigation."); Green v. 
Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 417 
(10th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that "[m]andamus proceedings have been 
considered outside of 
district court jurisdiction over 'civil actions,'" while concluding that 
writs of mandamus fall 
within the scope of § 1915 of the PLRA). 
    Neither is a writ of mandamus an "appeal."  In the context of the 
PLRA, the word 
"appeal" clearly means the appeal of a civil action.  See Martin, 96 F.3d 
at 854.  While 
mandamus is typically characterized as an appellate power, id. (mandamus 
is "realistically a form 
of interlocutory appeal"), it is different in kind from an appeal.  
Indeed, a writ of mandamus may 
not issue if a petitioner can obtain relief by appeal; a petition for 
mandamus "must not be used as 
a mere substitute for appeal."  16 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3932, at 185 (1977).  
    Because a writ of mandamus is neither a "civil action" nor an 
"appeal," our 
decision is not controlled by the plain meaning of the text.  We must, of 
course, ensure that we 
have not frustrated congressional intent.  See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 
U.S. 527, 535 (1980) 
(concluding that a court should move beyond literal construction of a 
statute to effectuate "the 
objects and policy of the law") (citations omitted).  The clear import of 
the PLRA is to curtail 
frivolous prison litigation, namely that brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and the Federal Torts 
Claims Act.  See Santana, 1996 WL 596845, at *3 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 104-378, 104th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996)).   
    As a result, we agree with the courts of appeals that have held that 
where the 
underlying litigation is criminal, or otherwise of the type that Congress 
did not intend to curtail, 
the petition for mandamus need not comply with the PLRA.  See Martin, 96 
F.3d at 854-55 
("[T]he scope of the new Act should turn on whether the litigation in 
which it is being filed is 
within that scope."); In re Paul Nagy, 89 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1996).  
This interpretation alone 
preserves the writ for prisoners who may have no other relief in a 
criminal action in which a 
court has exceeded its judicial power or failed to use its power "where 
there is a duty to do so."  
Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3rd Cir. 1988).  In the case 
before us, Madden seeks a 
writ of mandamus relating to a habeas corpus action.  This Court, in 
Santana, concluded that, 
because of the hybrid nature of habeas corpus actions and evidence that 
Congress did not intend 
to reform habeas corpus law in the PLRA, such actions were not subject to 
the Act's fee 
requirements.  1996 WL 596845, at *2-4.  Therefore, Madden is not required 
to meet the fee 
obligations of the PLRA.   
    Another reason that Congress could not have intended that petitions 
for writ of 
mandamus fall within the scope of the PLRA is that seeking a writ of 
mandamus is often the only 
way a litigant can obtain review of certain orders or can compel a 
district judge to act.  Congress 
has demonstrated a grave concern about delay in civil cases, see, e.g., 
Civil Justice Expense and 
Delay Reduction Plans, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (requiring district courts to 
implement plans 
intended in part to "ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of 
civil disputes").  
Mandamus petitions provide an avenue for dealing with the situation (which 
fortunately occurs 
infrequently) where cases have been unduly delayed in the district court.  
See, e.g., McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Polin, 429 F.2d 30, 30-31 (3rd Cir. 1970) (ordering 
district court not to defer 
ruling on a motion for transfer until all discovery was completed).   
    We have also held that mandamus is the appropriate remedy when the 
district 
court ignores this Court's mandate.  Blasband v. Rales, 979 F.2d 324, 328-
29 (3rd Cir. 1992). In 
Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3rd Cir. 1993), 
this Court held that 
mandamus is the proper way to seek review of a judge's order refusing to 
recuse under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455 where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  
Mandamus in these 
instances serves not only to correct a harm to a litigant, but to preserve 
judicial integrity and 
public confidence.  Review after final judgment might cure the harm to the 
litigant, but it would 
not cure the additional separate harm to the public confidence.   
    Because mandamus petitions fall outside the plain meaning of the PLRA, 
seesupra at 3-5, and the writ is an effective tool in exercising this 
court's supervisory powers, bona 
fide mandamus petitions, regardless of the nature of the underlying 
actions, cannot be subject to 
the PLRA. 
                                C. 
    A litigant should not be able to evade the PLRA by masking as a 
mandamus 
petition a paper otherwise subject to the Act.  We will, therefore, 
require that any action 
improperly styled as mandamus must meet the fee requirements of the PLRA.  
It is the nature of 
the document, rather than the label attached by the litigant, that 
controls.  This acknowledgment 
creates, however, a serious administrative problem in the processing of 
pro se litigation in the 
federal courts, particularly in the area of docketing.  Where the PLRA 
applies, the petitioner must 
file an affidavit of poverty, a six-month account statement, and a form 
authorizing prison 
officials to withdraw money from his account; where it does not, the 
petitioner need only file an 
affidavit of poverty.  Moreover, and more importantly, the Deputy Clerk 
receiving the papers, 
who is not law trained, will have to make a decision as to whether the 
PLRA applies in order to 
insure that the litigant has filed the proper documents.  While the Deputy 
Clerk will, of course, 
be able to consult the legal staff within the Court, it will not always be 
easy to determine from 
the papers whether the PLRA applies to something styled as a mandamus 
because it really masks 
a civil action or appeal that is subject to the PLRA. 
    Because of the importance of these concerns to the administration of 
justice 
within the Circuit, we think that it will be useful for the Clerk's office 
to posit that a paper styled 
as a mandamus petition will not be subject to the PLRA unless it appears 
clearly that the styling 
is an effort to avoid the requirements of that Act.  We also suggest that 
it follow the procedures 
set forth in the margin.  
         Of course, if a prisoner files a paper that is styled as a 
mandamus petition and that 
does not clearly appear to be an effort to avoid the requirements of the 
PLRA but that in fact 
constitutes an appeal in a civil action, the PLRA would likely apply and a 
filing fee would have 
to be collected.  This makes clear that the Clerk's office's treatment of 
questionable mandamus 
petitions must be subject to review by the Court.   
 
                               II. 
         Turning to the merits of Madden's mandamus petition, we find no 
basis for 
granting the petition for writ of mandamus.  Mandamus is an appropriate 
remedy in 
extraordinary circumstances only.  Kerr v. U.S Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 
403 (1976).  A petitioner 
seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus must have no other adequate 
means to obtain the 
desired relief, and must show that the right to issuance is clear and 
indisputable.  See Allied 
Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980); Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co. v. 
Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953). 
         Madden asks this Court to issue an order directing the district 
court to decide his 
case forthwith and to hold that his claims have been exhausted.  As we 
have noted above, an 
appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that undue 
delay is tantamount to a 
failure to exercise jurisdiction, see, e.g., McClellan v. Young, 421 F.2d 
690 (6th Cir. 1970), and, 
without actually issuing a writ, may order a district court not to defer 
adjudicating a case.  SeeMcDonnell Douglas Corp., 429 F.2d 30-31.  Madden 
cannot demonstrate that a writ of 
mandamus is warranted.  Because he can appeal the decision of the district 
court when a final 
order is issued, Madden cannot demonstrate that no other adequate means of 
relief regarding the 
issue of exhaustion exists.   
         Madden's claims of delay have greater force.  That resolution of 
Madden's claims 
has been delayed is clear.  The Magistrate Judge's Report and 
Recommendation was filed in 
February, 1996.  Madden filed objections in March and motions to amend the 
petition and for 
appointment of counsel in April.  As of the time Madden filed his petition 
for writ of mandamus, 
no action had been taken on these motions and no final order had been 
issued.  Although this 
delay is of concern, it does not yet rise to the level of a denial of due 
process.  We are confident 
that the district court will issue its decision quickly. 
         In sum, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.  
Because the 
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) are inapplicable, no docketing fee will 
be assessed.  The 
petition for writ of mandamus will be denied.  This denial is without 
prejudice to petitioner filing 
a new petition for writ of mandamus if the district court does not act 
within 60 days of the date of 
this order. 
